NEGOTIATING WITH THE TALIBAN, PART III

The euphoria over the killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has now shifted to the question of the effects of his killing on the war in Afghanistan. Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has said bin Laden's death makes it easier for us to get out of Afghanistan. Senator Joe Lieberman said Osama's death gives us momentum in the war. Presumably Lieberman means, "so let's keep going".

Then there are the questions of what did the Pakistanis know about bin Laden's hiding out not far from their capital, and when did they know it? There's also the question of who will succeed bin Laden as both the symbolic and operational leader of al-Qaeda.

This posting focuses on the last question but in a different way. Now that bin Laden is dead and al-Qaeda is, at least for now, leaderless, maybe it's time to take advantage of the disarray and quickly press for serious talks with the Taliban about a political settlement in Afghanistan, a solution that would hasten our exodus from this long and costly war.

Before registering my own views, a quick retracing of how we got into the war is in order. To capsulize: bin Laden's al-Qaeda was the terrorist gang that put together and executed the destruction of the World Trade Center on 9/11/2001, killing nearly 3,000 people. Bin Laden had his base in Afghanistan and was the "guest" of the Taliban who governed that country and repressed its people, particularly women, through radical application of Islamic law. Our invasion of Afghanistan was to kill off both the guest and the host government. A decade later we are still fighting the war.

Given that the war is with the Taliban inside of Afghanistan and in enclaves in Pakistan, does bin Laden's death do what Levin or Lieberman think? To me the crucial point is that bin Laden's demise may create a new opportunity to persuade the Taliban to negotiate a political settlement to the war and thus make it easier to get out. Last fall President Obama's former National Security Advisor, General James Jones said, "The Taliban generally as a group has never signed on to the global jihad business and doesn't seem to have ambitions beyond its region." (see earlier post). In a sense it defined how the Taliban could cleanse itself -- break free of al-Qaeda. Perhaps the Taliban and its spiritual leader Mullah Omar will see that with the death of bin Laden, they are free, in effect, to throw the now leaderless Afghanistan-linked al-Qaeda under the bus and do some serious bargaining with the relevant parties about ending the war. This point has also been made by General Petraeus. There have been reports from time to time about various negotiations between the government of Afghan President Karzai and the Taliban, but little, if anything, has been said about any progress. And it must be kept in mind that there are important tribal and ethnic leaders in Afghanistan who are bitterly opposed to both Karzai and the Taliban and may resist any settlement that would bring the Taliban into the government.

This Taliban-free-of-al-Qaeda approach may also appeal to Pakistan which hosts several factions of the Taliban within its borders. While elements of al-Qaeda are also within Pakistan, that country's past attachment is to the Taliban which Pakistan has supported and views as its trump card (particularly the hard line Haqqani group) for exercising future political influence in neighboring Afghanistan. Certainly the presence within its borders of both its Taliban allies and al-Qaeda has caused Pakistan considerable grief through terrorist attacks on Pakistan itself, as well as in severely complicating Pakistan's relations with the United States. Pakistan, along with the Afghans, may now see the benefit of taking the death of bin Laden as an opportunity to promote getting meaningful negotiations started for an end of the war. Any political settlement is almost certain to reinstate some form of Taliban participation in Afghan governance (see previous post) and Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, but this time without the burden of al-Qaeda.

That would hardly mean the end of al-Qaeda as a terrorist threat to the U.S. and other countries. It already has franchised operations in Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to name just some of the places where it has established organizations. The al-Qaeda leaders and followers currently sheltered in Pakistan could relocate or, in a worst case scenario for Pakistan, remain there and increase its terrorist operations in hopes of toppling the regime of Pakistan and perhaps gaining access to and control of parts of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

So the bottom line is to press quickly for meaningful post-bin Laden talks between the relevant parties and the Taliban. Such a quick resumption, if achieved, doesn't mean there would be a quick settlement, but bin Laden's death may have created a window of opportunity for having another go at it.