Last month I posted two pieces on Iraq. The first, "Darkness at the End of the Tunnel", followed by "Stepping Through the Looking Glass". The first was very pessimistic about political events in Iraq and its effect on U.S. policy. In the second, I tried to see if there was some reason for optimism I was overlooking. The first posting had it right.
The "darkness" conclusion was further confirmed last week with the return to Baghdad of the U.S.'s arch Iraqi nemesis, Muqtada al-Sadr. He didn't sneak back from Tehran in the dark of night. He returned in triumph from three years of self-imposed exile in the Iranian capital after being driven out of Baghdad through the combined efforts of the U.S. and the then-and-still Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. And no less important is what has been noted before, that al-Maliki owes the "still" P.M. to al-Sadr who helped to clear the political path for al-Maliki by casting his (al-Sadr) 40 parliamentary votes for the P.M. to form a new coalition government. While it has not been stated outright, it is most likely that part of the deal was that al-Maliki would stand by the 2011 timetable for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the country.
The status of forces agreement on troop withdrawal was negotiated between al-Maliki and former President George W. Bush who made a mess of things in Iraq in the first place. (see July 19th posting). But even with the withdrawal date clearly established, there were and still are hawks in the Bush and Obama administrations and Congress who want to leave some troops in place to act as a kind of strategic trip wire (not just for training security forces) against any Iranian efforts to insert itself militarily into Iraqi affairs. Such a trip wire won't stop Iranian political interference which already has had significant impacts in Baghdad, probably including pressing al-Sadar to join the government coalition to give Iran a strong voice inside the governing tent. Al-Sadr's return should further dim U.S. hopes for retaining forces there, but as Yogi Berra said, "It ain't over 'til it's over". With nearly a year before the troop deadline, there could be a fall out between al-Maliki and al-Sadr and give new hope to our hawks. Certainly the byzantine world of Iraqi politics gives aid and comfort to such hopes.
But for the purpose of this posting, let us presume that all of our troops are gone by December 31. What then in terms of countering assumed Iranian ambitions in Iraq and the region? Militarily we still have plenty of force in the region in Kuwait and Qatar and on the sea. That force is sufficient to serve our strategic interests in protecting oil rich Saudi Arabia and the bordering states such as the Emirates, Qatar, etc. But we have seen what the use of so-called hard power or force has gotten us since 2003. We are not seen as liberators who rescued a country from a dictatorship but as invaders and occupiers, or worse--new Christian crusaders seeking to destroy Islam. It is time to simply think of our regional goal as stability. The starting point for that will be our exit from Iraq and ending the instability created by our invasion, our continued presence, and the collateral empowerment of Iran. We have to stop thinking in terms of implanting our political values and face the reality of how we are perceived by those who live there.
If the goal of regional stability is indeed what we seek, then pass the torch to someone better able to advance that goal. The candidate that comes to mind is Turkey, a member of NATO and long time friend of the United States. It is Muslim (Sunni) and it has and is further developing important, cultural, diplomatic, and economic ties with adjoining Islamic nations in the region, including Iran. Further, since l949 Muslim Turkey has had diplomatic relations with Israel although that has been strained in recent years with Israel's invasion of Gaza in 2008/09 and Israel's forcefully halting a humanitarian aid vessel heading for Gaza last year in which eight Turks were killed. And Turkey's image in the Muslim world has improved considerably with its shedding of the earlier perception of its being a U.S. lackey. The change came with Turkey's refusal in 2003 to allow the U.S. to use Turkey as a northern invasion route to Iraq and its more recent "no" vote (as a non-permanent member) in the U.N. Security Council against another round of economic sanctions against Iran.
The biggest obstacle to Turkey's soft power approach is the United States. Our primary way of countering Iran is reliance on military force. A policy of stepping aside and allowing Turkey's soft approach to promote stability in a region that includes Iran may be too shocking to the hawks and Israel's strong supporters in Congress. Further, the fact that a Muslim led Turkish government replaced a secular government (although policy was often driven by the military) in Ankara in 2003 makes them suspect as a reliable regional stabilizer. That is, the hawks, along with many others with anti-Muslim sentiments, would argue that somewhere down the line the Muslim-led government in Turkey will become increasingly fundamentalist and become a part of the problem.
But one can only speculate so far. Right now it would be a great leap forward for us to just get out of Iraq and stop the hand wringing by some about how we can somehow keep a credible military force there, in whatever capacity. If it is regional stability we seek (we who contributed so much to regional instability) we should step aside and let the Turks try their way -- and without our trying to kibbitz from the sidelines.
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