THE MIDDLE EAST: DARKNESS AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL

At one point during the Vietnam war then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said he saw "light at the end of the tunnel," his upbeat assessment of American military progress there. It didn't turn out that way. If we apply the same imagery to the situation in the Middle East today, it would be difficult to conclude anything other than that for U.S. policy in the region--there is darkness at the end of the tunnel. This posting takes a look at where things stand on the Israeli-Palestinian so-called peace process and Iraq and its political future. (See an earlier posting on this issue--The Peace Process That Isn't and Maybe Never Was.) A third big regional problem is Iran's political interference in Iraq and Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions, but that subject is too big to squeeze into this posting, suffice it to say there is also no sign of light there.

First, the Israel-Palestinian peace process and its goal of creating an independent Palestinian state through the return of territory captured by Israel in the l967 war. There was much fanfare in early September when President Obama hosted a meeting in Washington intended to restart the moribund peace process. At the end of the meeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas agreed to keep the process going. One more meeting was quickly held but things broke down soon after that. The stumbling block was the same issue that had plagued the process before the Washington meeting, Israeli housing settlements on land the Palestinians want returned. The scenario went something like this.

The Washington meeting was made possible when Israel agreed to a moratorium on settlement building but that freeze ended in late September. Abbas said he would not return to the talks unless the freeze was extended. To get Israel to agree to another 90-day moratorium, the U.S. offered Netanyahu an arms sale, a U.S. veto of any Palestinian effort to take the issue directly to the United Nations Security Council, plus a later security agreement with Israel. All of this was just to get Israel to extend the freeze an additional 90 days during which it was optimistically and perhaps naively believed there could be some general outline on lands to be exchanged. Right wing opposition within his government forced Netanyahu to say no to a further freeze and Abbas repeated his position--no freeze, no talks. After further efforts to get the talks restarted, the U.S. has now abandoned that effort with no alternative approach on the horizon. Thus, the often interrupted peace process has once more broken down, even before it really got restarted. Now to another regional headache, Iraq.

As often stated by analysts and on this blog, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the overthrow of dictator Saddam Hussein, Iran's chief antagonist, opened the door to greater Iranian influence in Iraq. That increased influence has been made easier by the ties that have been established and are getting stronger between the Shia-dominated government of Iraq and its co-religionists in Iran. In his efforts to retain power after the close elections last March, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has allied himself with the U.S. arch enemy in Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr, an influential Shia leader who took up residence in Iran after he was forced out of Baghdad by U.S. forces. He still resides in Iran. (See previous post -- Iran: The 800 Pound Gorilla Is Getting Bigger)

Meanwhile, al-Maliki made direct overtures to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the latter's support against al-Maliki's primary opposition, a secular Shia-Sunni coalition. It has been nine months since the parliamentary election and al-Maliki is in the process of forming a government but no final arrangement has been confirmed. It appears evident, however, that U.S. efforts to curb Iranian influence in any new government are failing. Add to this the continued violence between Shia and Sunni and, more recently, attacks on Iraqi Christians and the picture is one of a significant lack of security. The U.S. government, with doubtful backing of the American public, would like to retain a military presence in Iraq, but an agreement between al-Maliki and former President Bush calls for the withdrawal of all American forces by the end of next year. The latest on this is that al-Maliki is not backing away from that deadline and sticking with that arrangement may be part of the deal between him and al-Sadr who has been adamantly opposed to what he regards as continued U.S. military occupation.

And if all of this isn't enough, there is increasing activity by Syria in shipping arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon to increase its military threat on Israel's northern border. Syria is also seeking to reassert its overall influence in Lebanese affairs, an influence that was seemingly ended when Syria, under United Nations pressure, withdraw its last troops from Lebanon in 2005. Syria first sent troops into Lebanon in l976 to help quell the violence of Lebanon's civil war. Syria also appears to be a source for the growing infiltration of terrorists into bordering Iraq. The Obama administration through direct talks with Syria had hoped to steer that country away from its destabilizing activities in the region and from its strengthening ties to Iran. At this point, the U.S. effort does not appear to have succeeded and Obama, because of Republican opposition, cannot even get Senate approval to send a new ambassador to Damascus to carry on its policy of engagement.

In sum, the U.S. policy/policies in two big problem areas of the Middle East are not doing well. In the case of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and Iranian interference in Iraqi politics, there doesn't seem to be any sign of light at the end of the tunnel. The policy now is --lengthen the tunnel.