AND NOW LIBYA

It is difficult to see any pluses for the U.S. coming from the multitude of dilemmas that we confront in the Arab world stretching from the Middle East across north Africa. And the Libyan intervention is too new to have a sense of how that will turn out. Perhaps there is one plus -- the U.S. may no longer act as policeman of the world, a reduced role supported by many in this country. From the U.N. sanctioned Korean war to military intervention to halt ethnic cleansing in what was Yugoslavia to the ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, this country has taken that role upon itself; and there are many countries who welcomed our policeman role. Now we seem to be a war weary, financially challenged nation, still casting a long shadow in world events, but with reduced substance and public will.

Not to draw an analogy, but all of this makes me think about Great Britain after World Wars I and II. After World War I, Britain was broke; the war had depleted its treasury and the country was deeply in debt, primarily to the U.S. London was losing its position as the financial capital of the world. After World War II, Britain became a second rate power, no longer able to retain its colonial empire and standing in the shadow of the new world powers --U.S. and the Soviet Union. The final denouement came in l956 when Britain, along with Israel and France, invaded Egypt to topple President Nasser who had nationalized the Suez Canal, and to reassert control over that vital waterway, Britain's historic lifeline to what was left of its Asian empire and the key to retaining what left of its influence in the Middle East. Under pressure from U.S. President Eisenhower, they were forced to withdraw their forces, a humiliating event for the once world power.

From all readings we now appear to be a waning power in the same part of the world, waning in the sense that the Middle Eastern rulers whom we have long supported no longer trust us. That trust eroded seriously after what they see as our abandonment of long-time ally Egyptian President Mubarak, and our pressure for political reforms in other countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Bahrain. They are now acting independently to protect their own primary self-interest, the continuation of their autocratic rule. Nothing illustrates this independent action more than the Saudi decision to militarily intervene in Bahrain to support a fellow monarch and to prevent the Shia majority from gaining control of the Bahraini government. The last thing the Sunni Muslim monarch in Saudi Arabia wants is to have Bahrain fall under control of the Shiites and thereby give a foothold to Shia Iran at the Saudi front door. The Saudi intervention was made easier by the world's attention to the disasters in Japan and Gaddafi's repressive defense of his regime in Libya.

There does not seem to be an easy way out of our dilemmas in the Arab world. Our calls for political reform and our measured support of the protesters run counter to what these rulers believe to be their vital self-preservation. The United Nations approval of a military response to Gaddafi's defense of his regime finds us taking a second position to Britain and France in that response. However, this is more a reflection of the political dilemmas we face in the region rather than an indicator of waning military power. The British and French got far ahead of us in promoting a no-fly zone so it seemed like a good idea to let them stay out front. Further, the Arab League and several Arab countries have backed military action or are expected to actively participate in the action. Given our two wars and continuing presence in Muslim Iraq and Muslim Afghanistan, it seems to be a good idea not to take the lead role in still another assault on a Muslim nation.

While this is not directly related to the point of waning U.S. influence in the Arab world, there is another relevant point to our support of the anti-Gaddafi rebellion. When the first Gulf War ended in l991, we created two no-fly zones in Iraq, one being the northern zone to protect the Kurds against any revenge by Saddam Hussein. Over the 10+ year duration of that zone, the Kurds had what was in effect a semi-autonomous region under U.S. protection. That semi-autonomous status has given the Kurds a distinct advantage today when it comes to settling various issues between the Kurds and the Arab parts of Iraq.

Now a no-fly zone has been created in northern Libya but the difference from the Kurdish zone in Iraq is that we don't really know whom we are protecting -- "good guys" because they are anti-Gaddafi, or potentially "bad guys" who may provide a haven for radical Islamic jihadists with a terrorism agenda? This isn't to argue against such protection, although there are reasonable contrarian views, but only to raise the point about future uncertainties if the protected area, or part of it, becomes the political and military base camp to plan for a post-Gaddafi Libya. Now back to the broader theme of waning U.S. power in the Arab world.

As said in previous postings, waning power doesn't equate with impotence. We are still the dominant military power in the region and thus we count for something, a lot actually, when it comes to guarding/controlling the vital oil shipping routes in the region. We are still seen as the dominant countervailing power to the rising influence of Iran, although the Saudis may become more assertive themselves in confronting Iran. But the remaining monarchs in the region are less likely to listen to us on such things as political reform and any potential role they may have in the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation. The Saudis who have been sideline players from time to time in offering a solution, are less likely to get involved now and risk a backlash at home at a time when defense of the regime is the single most important objective.

So right now the U.S. policy seems to be salvaging whatever influence it may have left in the Arab world. That in turn likely means an even more muted advocacy for political reform and greater acceptance, not openly expressed, of more repressive measures against protesters/revolutionaries.