NEGOTIATING WITH THE TALIBAN(S)

Red Rascal, We Need you Again!

Red Rascal to the rescue? In case you don't follow the Doonesbury cartoon or haven't read a previous post, Red Rascal is Garry Trudeau's super hero who rights the wrongs committed by the Taliban "evil doers" in Afghanistan. In this week's Doonesbury series, the Red Rascal in an expanded role is being asked to deal with the problem of a U.S. contractor who, along with other such contractors, is to be banned by President Hamid Karzai from doing future business in Afghanistan. This post is to suggest that while Red Rascal is in Afghanistan, he should also talk with Karzai about the political negotiations the latter is undertaking with the "evil doers".

Karzai has officially stated that he wants to negotiate with the Taliban about a political solution to the now 10-year old war. The war began when the Afghan-based, Taliban-supported al Qaeda successfully planned and carried out the attack that destroyed the World Trade Center. After a decade of war between the United States/ NATO and the Taliban/al Qaeda, it seems clear that a military solution is not likely, thus a political way out must be found. (Sounds strangely like the situation in Vietnam in the early 70s.) In holding such talks, the Karzai government has in mind what have come to be called "moderate" Taliban leaders. Presumably that approximates how President Obama's now resigned National Security Advisor, General James Jones, referred to the Taliban recently. "The Taliban generally as a group has never signed on to the global jihad business and doesn't seem to have ambitions beyond its region". Within that context, Karzai has the U.S. blessing for negotiating with the Taliban.

While Karzai-Taliban negotiations are a necessary first step to ending the war and allowing the U.S. and its allies to extricate themselves from the Afghan mess, what comes next may not be so simple. A few major stumbling blocks lie on the path to a political settlement.

1. What does Taliban "participation" in governance mean? Is it simply je jure recognition of the de facto situation of Taliban control of various parts of the country? If so, does participation mean recognition of local Taliban leaders as the formal, officially recognized governors of the territory? (Would this also mean the United States can then stop paying contractors ((be careful Red Rascal)) who in turn pay local warlords to protect our military supplies being trucked through their areas, payments that seem to trickle down to Taliban leaders in the area.)

Or does participation in governance also mean the Taliban having a significant role in national decision making with important cabinet positions in Kabul? As noted above, participation in governance at the subnational level would simply be recognition of the Taliban's existing control of many areas of the country. That may be the easy part. Elevating Taliban participation to a significant national role is more problematic. According to reports, the 68-person peace council created by Karzai to guide the negotiations is heavily tilted toward members who have been fighting the Taliban for years. Among their concerns is that in allowing the Taliban into the national government in any capacity might lead to an eventual Taliban takeover and a return to the brutal pre-2001 Taliban control. Here I'll refer to another previous post about Germany in l933 when a devious ex-Chancellor thought he could bring Hitler into the government as a figurehead Chancellor while the "ex" would control the real reins of power. We know how that turned out with Hitler quickly taking control of everything.

2. What about that part of the Taliban, along with its al Qaeda associates, that is based in Pakistan? These are the most aggressive, hardline, elusive participants in the ongoing war. According to a Washington Post report, one part of the Pakistan-based Taliban, the Quetta Shura, is a possible participant in the negotiations. But another faction, the Haqqani group, supposedly is not agreeable and it is this group that is the principal target of the U.S. bombing campaign in Pakistan. Both groups supposedly have close ties to the Pakistani intelligence service which has long been linked with the Taliban.

Perhaps our bombing campaign is an effort to convince the Haqqani leaders that they too should participate in any negotiations. (That would be akin to the efforts of the Nixon administration in l972 to carry out massive air attacks in North Vietnam to force them to the bargaining table to end that war.) However, that leaves the issue of Pakistan's role in any negotiations with the Taliban. Right now it seem like Karzai, with U.S. blessing, has taken a go-it-alone approach to negotiations with the Taliban, an approach that may work as a short-run tactic to deal with local, Afghan-based leaders. However, any long-term strategic solution to bring stability to the region is likely to require setting a chair for Pakistan at the bargaining table.

In sum, any efforts to deal with the Taliban to produce short-term and/or long-term solutions are complex undertakings with a number of moving parts and players that must be dealt with. Also,while backing Karzai in his efforts, the U.S. has learned in a variety of ways that trusting Karzai is a problem in itself. It is clearly a situation where we need the Red Rascal to work his super powers.