It is difficult to find a story recently about the Middle East , including Afghanistan, that does not feature Iran or its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
The most recent was the visit of Afghan President Hamid Karzai to Tehran. A few days before that it was Iraq's interim Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki who made the pilgrimmage. It was also big news when Ahmadinejad sent a representative to Rome to attend an international meeting, including the United States, on the political and military situation in Afghanistan. A week earlier the Mideast news highlighted the state visit of the Iranian President to Lebanon where the featured part of the trip were the meetings with leaders of Hezbollah, one of Israel's leading adversaries. And earlier this month, Ahmadinejad met with Syrian President Bashar Assad in Tehran where Assad expressed dim hopes for success of the Israeli-Palestinian so-called peace process. Finally, just two weeks before that the Iranian President travelled to Damascus where the two Presidents discussed a variety of mutual interests. During the visit, Assad was awarded Iran's highest medal for support of the Palestinians and Hezbollah. (It must be noted, however, that Iran and Syria, both supporters of Hezbollah in Lebanon, are competitors for influence in Iraq. And while Assad and Ahmadinejad exchanged visits, the nomination of a new U.S. ambassador to Syria has been stalled in the Senate; our ambassador was withdrawn in 2005 because of Syria's implication in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri.)
Not much if anything of this could be considered good news for the United States. The Karzai visit to Tehran was concluded, according to The New York Times (NYT) with one of the Afghan President's closest advisers being given a sack of Euros at the time of the plane's departure to be used for advancing Iranian interests and against American/NATO interests within the Afghan government. Put another way, a sack of bribe money, some of which is likely to find its way into the bank account of the advisor.
The sack of money is likely to further complicate President Obama's statement in early August (see previous post) in which he said that discussions with Iran on Afghanistan issues was a "separate track" from our confrontation with Ahmadinejad over Iran's nuclear ambitions. Thus Iran's participatiion in the Rome meeting. There has been evidence for some time that Iran was aiding Afghan insurgents in a variety of ways to thwart American/NATO war efforts. And our trust in Karzai has been minimal, to say the most, because of conflict on several issues, not the least of which is the massive corruption within Karzai's government. The NYT report on the bribe money, which apparently was not a first-time occurrence, only adds to the wide recognition of the corruption in Kabul. But the public disclosure of the large amounts of Iranian money also makes it more awkward to pursue the "separate track" policy which already has its share of opponents in Washington. The "separate track" seems to have multiple side tracks, each requiring its own attention before Iran can be fully accredited as a negotiating partner for broader talks on Afghanistan's future.
That brings us to the Baghdad-Tehran road-well-traveled. The al-Maliki visit, not his first, was to gain further Iranian backing for an Iraqi political settlement to the almost 8-month old impasse in forming a new government following the early March parliamentary elections. (It should be noted that al-Maliki's most recent visit to Tehran was part of a regional trip with scheduled stops in Jordan and Egypt.) Much to the consternation of the United States, al-Maliki scored a significant coup a few weeks ago when he gained the support of the very anti-American Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr who is currently living in self-imposed exile in Iran.
Al-Sadr's willingness to join an al-Maliki coalition, on unknown terms, is viewed in Washington as a major access point for Iran to further grow its already significant influence in Iraqi affairs. That potential coalition has forced Washington to reverse its policy on a new government. The United States had been trying to hasten al-Maliki in to a coalition that would, among other things, include more Sunni representation. With the new linkage between al-Maliki and al-Sadr, Washington took a 180 turn and is now asking al-Maliki to slow down the formation of such a coalition in hope of reducing or eliminating any al-Sadr role.
In sum, Tehran, meaning Ahmadinejad right now, has become a hub for a complex array of major Middle East issues, none of which seems to be working out for U.S. policy, at least at this point. However, as said in previous posts, our political and military polices in the region, some decades old and some more recent, have contributed significantly to the empowerment of Iran in the region. Obama's efforts to undo or modify these policies is a slow, grinding process, with opponents both at home and abroad and with no certainty, or maybe even probability, of success.
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